Aspects of identity: From the inner-outer metaphor to a tetrapartite model of the self

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A brief history of the AIQ

Phase 1: The inner-outer metaphor and early versions of the AIQ

Cheek and Briggs (1982) developed the first version of the AIQ (see Table 1) using items taken from Sampson’s (1978) list of identity characteristics, which participants rated on a
scale from 1 (Not very important to my sense of who I am) to 5 (Extremely important to my sense of who I am). The theory behind the initial version of the AIQ (and all subsequent versions) posited that there are different aspects of an individual’s identity, and that individuals vary in the extent to which they are oriented toward or place importance on these different self-aspects. Indeed, both Cheek and Briggs’ and Sampson’s research drew from the tradition, dating back at least to James’ (1890), of the inner-outer metaphor, a protean concept in personality and social psychology that distinguishes between personal, private, intrapsychic experiences, traits, and views and social, public, interpersonal experiences, traits, and views (see Hogan & Cheek, 1983; Lamphere & Leary, 1990). Accordingly, the first version of the AIQ, which was developed in the context of private and public self-consciousness theory (e.g., Scheier & Carver, 1983), measured the importance people placed on two aspects of identity: personal aspects (e.g., “my dreams and imagination”) and social aspects (e.g., “my popularity and attractiveness to other people”; see Table 1). Sampson conceptualized his list of identity characteristics as forming a single, bipolar dimension of internality-externality, but Cheek and Briggs showed that his scales were actually slightly positively correlated ($r = .19$), as were the two identity orientation scales of the AIQ ($r = .29$), suggesting two relatively distinct aspects of identity, rather than one bipolar dimension.

**Table 1. Early versions of the personal and public (social) identity orientation items of the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Six early personal identity items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My emotions and feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My future goals and aspirations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My intellectual ability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My dreams and imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ways I cope with my fears and anxieties, with the stresses and strains of living</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My thoughts and ideas, the way my mind works</td>
</tr>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seven early social identity items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My popularity and attractiveness to other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ways I have of influencing and of affecting others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My physical features—my height, weight, shape of my body, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memberships that I have in various groups*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a part of the many generations of my family*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My feeling of pride in my country, being proud to be a citizen*</td>
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Notes: *These early Social Identity Orientation items were removed from that scale for development of the new Collective Identity Orientation Scale (Cheek, Underwood, & Cutler, 1985). The early items are from Cheek and Hogan (1981) and Cheek and Briggs (1982). The Social scale was renamed as the Public Identity Orientation Scale in 2014 (Cheek et al., 2014).

**Phase 2: A third identity orientation scale**

Abrams (1988) subsequently criticized the Social Identity Orientation Scale of the AIQ for failing to capture social identity theory’s (e.g., Tajfel, 1981) emphasis on group membership at the same time that our psychometric analyses revealed that some social identity items were loading on a third factor. Also at this time, cross-cultural research was highlighting the importance of group membership as a fundamental aspect of identity, and thus we revised the AIQ by taking some social identity items and creating some new items to construct a third scale to measure collective identity orientation in addition to personal and social identity orientations. Following James’ (1890) concept of the social me, we originally used the term social identity to refer to one’s public image, reputation, and popularity, whereas we used
collective identity to refer to one’s group memberships and social categorizations (as recommended by, e.g., Ashmore, Deaux, & McLaughlin-Volpe, 2004; cf. Nario-Redmond, Biernat, Eidelman, & Palenske, 2004); however, because of the risk of confusion given the use of social identity to refer to group membership in social identity theory, we have recently renamed social identity orientation public identity orientation (Cheek, Cheek, Grimes, & Tropp, 2014) to emphasize its measurement of the importance of public aspects of identity such as reputation.

Psychometric analyses revealed that the Public and Collective Identity Orientation Scales formed distinct and relatively orthogonal scales (Cheek, Tropp, Chen, & Underwood, 1994; see also Table S1 in supplemental material) and the distinction between public and collective identity orientations was further supported by patterns of ethnic group differences. Drawing on cultural research on individualism-collectivism (e.g., Triandis, 1989), we predicted and found that collective identity orientation – but not public identity orientation – was higher in college students from more collectivistic cultural backgrounds (see Table 2).

**Phase 3: A tetrapartite model of the self**

In the 1990s, a surge of research on and theoretical interest in relational aspects of identity (i.e., self-aspects based on close, dyadic relationships; see, e.g., Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Baldwin, 1992; Chen, Boucher, & Tapias, 2006) and their measurement with personality scales (e.g., Cross, Bacon, & Morris, 2000) closely followed the increased interest in cross-cultural variation in independent and interdependent self-aspects. We predicted that, although relational, public, and collective aspects of identity all involve interpersonal relationships, they would represent three distinct dimensions of the interdependent self (see Robins, Norem, & Cheek, 1999, Table 3, p. 451). Accordingly, we developed a Relational Identity Orientation Scale for the AIQ, and thus several decades of theorizing and scale design culminated in the AIQ-IV, which measures the importance of four distinct aspects of identity – the personal, relational, public, and collective selves (see Table 3).

All four identity orientations demonstrate convergent validity (e.g., relational identity orientation correlates with relational self-construal) and discriminant validity (e.g., only public identity orientation correlates substantially with public self-consciousness), and the AIQ-IV has a robust four-factor structure (see Cheek, Tropp, Smith, & Cheek, 2017). Indeed, the AIQ-IV has recently been used to demonstrate convergent and divergent validity for a new measure of self- and other-interest (Gerbasi & Prentice, 2013). Importantly, while it is clear that the AIQ-IV measures individual differences in the subjective value people place on the four

### Table 2. Ethnic group differences in personal, public, and collective identity orientations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity orientation</th>
<th>European Americans n = 105</th>
<th>Asian Americans n = 181</th>
<th>African Americans n = 181</th>
<th>Latinos/Latinas n = 54</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Personal identity</td>
<td>42.22&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.62</td>
<td>39.88&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.05</td>
<td>42.06&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.06</td>
<td>42.61&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 3.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public identity</td>
<td>23.81&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 4.67</td>
<td>24.68&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 4.32</td>
<td>24.85&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.35</td>
<td>25.20&lt;sub&gt;a&lt;/sub&gt; ± 4.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective identity</td>
<td>22.94&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.55</td>
<td>25.13&lt;sub&gt;b&lt;/sub&gt; ± 4.88</td>
<td>27.66&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.50</td>
<td>28.20&lt;sub&gt;c&lt;/sub&gt; ± 5.26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Means with different subscripts differed significantly (p < .05) in a Scheffé post-hoc analysis. Adapted from Cheek, Tropp, Underwood, and Cheek (2013).
Table 3. Items for the personal, relational, public, and collective identity orientation scales of the Aspects of Identity Questionnaire-IV.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal identity orientation</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My personal values and moral standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My dreams and imagination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My personal goals and hopes for the future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My emotions and feelings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My thoughts and ideas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ways I deal with my fears and anxieties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My feeling of being a unique person, being distinct from others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowing that I continue to be essentially the same inside even though life involves many external changes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My self-knowledge, my ideas about what kind of person I really am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My personal self-evaluation, the private opinion I have of myself</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relational identity orientation items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My relationships with the people I feel close to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Being a good friend to those I really care about</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My commitment to being a concerned relationship partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharing significant experiences with my close friends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having mutually satisfying personal relationships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecting on an intimate level with another person</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developing caring relationships with others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My desire to understand the true thoughts and feelings of my best friend or romantic partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Having close bonds with other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My feeling of connectedness with those I am close to</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public identity orientation items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>My popularity with other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ways in which other people react to what I say and do</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My physical appearance: my height, my weight, and the shape of my body</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My reputation, what others think of me</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My attractiveness to other people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My gestures and mannerisms, the impression I make on others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My social behavior, such as the way I act when meeting people</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Collective identity orientation items</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Being a part of the many generations of my family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My race or ethnic background</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Places where I live or where I was raised</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My feeling of belonging to my community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My feeling of pride in my country, being proud to be a citizen</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My commitments on political issues or my political activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>My language, such as my regional accent or dialect or a second language that I know</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Participants are presented with the following instructions: “These items describe different aspects of identity. Please read each item carefully and consider how it applies to you. Fill in the blank next to each item by choosing a number from the scale below: 1 = Not important to my sense of who I am; 2 = Slightly important to my sense of who I am; 3 = Somewhat important to my sense of who I am; 4 = Very important to my sense of who I am; 5 = Extremely important to my sense of who I am.” The full AIQ-IV – presented in full in supplemental material – also includes 10 items that are not scored on the four identity orientation scales. In general, these special items (SP) are intended to provide single item assessment of the subjective importance of dimensions that have been included in various theories and measurement models of multidimensional self-esteem (e.g., physical abilities, academic performance, occupation/career; Briggs & Cheek, 1986). Dollinger et al. (1996) formed a 5-item ad hoc Superficial Identity scale from the AIQ item pool, and Dollinger (1996) made a 3-item ad hoc scale for Academic/College Identity and also reported some analyses involving individual AIQ items.
identities should turn to the measure developed for that purpose by Jackson (1981; see items in Tropp, 1992).

Identity orientations also relate to more implicit measures of self-concept content, providing evidence of their construct validity and ability to capture the extent to which different aspects of identity matter to an individual. For example, Dollinger, Preston, O'Brien, and DiLalla (1996) found that identity orientations predicted the composition of participants’ autophotographic essays, such that participants higher in personal identity orientation and lower in public and collective identity orientation had more individualistic photographs in their essays, whereas the essays of participants higher in public and collective identity orientation featured more photographs with friends and family, and scored higher on Dollinger et al.’s content-analytic scores of relatedness. Similarly, Tropp (1992) found that participants who had a more collective identity orientation were more likely to spontaneously name group-based aspects of identity when listing self-attributes on the Twenty Statements Test (Kuhn & McPartland, 1954). Thus, as a result of our theoretical and empirical analyses, we have adopted a tetrapartite model of the self that conceptualizes the self-concept as comprising the personal or individual self along with three interdependent selves – the relational, public, and collective selves (see Figure 1).

The tetrapartite self

The development of the current version of the AIQ, the AIQ-IV, followed from both psychometric and theoretical analyses of the psychological content of the self-concept, and these analyses have led us to adopt a tetrapartite model of the self to more fully capture the different facets of individuals’ identities. The more prominent model of the self in contemporary psychology, however, is the tripartite self, which recognizes only three aspects of identity: the individual or personal self, the relational self, and the collective self. In this section, we briefly discuss why we view the tripartite self as incomplete and highlight several lines of research for which the public self is an essential theoretical construct.

The tripartite self has been adopted as a theoretical perspective in much of the recent literature on the self (e.g., Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Cross, Hardin, & Gercek-Swing, 2011; Gaertner et al., 2012; Kashima et al., 1995; Sedikides, Gaertner, Luke, O’Mara, & Gebauer, 2013; Vignoles, Schwartz, & Luyckx, 2011) and was seminally codified in the volume Individual

![Figure 1. A tetrapartite model of the self.](image-url)
Self, Relational Self, Collective Self (Sedikides & Brewer, 2001) over fifteen years ago. We agree that each self in the tripartite model is a fundamental aspect of identity – indeed, they are reflected in the Personal, Relational, and Collective Identity Orientation Scales of the AIQ-IV. However, our view is that the public self, reflected in the Public Identity Orientation Scale of the AIQ-IV, needs to be reclaimed by self and identity researchers. Of course, we are not the first to make such an argument. Kashima and Hardie (2000) noted that their use of tripartite model excluded the public self not because it should ultimately be viewed as a less fundamental part of identity, but because the tripartite model was a convenient heuristic in their work. They argued that future research should not take this convenient exclusion as a rigid theoretical approach, and Prentice (2001) similarly urged researchers to more carefully consider the public self in relation to the tripartite model. Nor is including the public self a completely new addition to models of the self – researchers thirty years ago, such as Triandis (1989) and Greenwald and Breckler (1985), included it in their theories of the structure of the self-concept.

Our factor analyses of the AIQ-IV have shown that public identity orientation is empirically distinguishable from orientations to personal, relational, and collective aspects of identity, and thus our results fail to support the division of the self into only three components (Cheek et al., 2017; Norem, Cheek, Cheek, & Tropp, 2015). Furthermore, in the following section, we review previous research on identity orientations that underlines the discriminant validity of public identity orientation; in fact, if anything, public identity orientation has been the most frequently studied identity orientation in the AIQ literature, and many studies have explored how valuing the public self influences motivation, behavior, and understandings of the social world. Thus, there is a strong empirical rationale for including the public self in a tetrapartite model of the self in future research.

In addition, however, there is perhaps an even stronger theoretical rationale for returning the public self to models of the self-concept: several research programs implicitly or explicitly rely on public aspects of identity, and without them are theoretically untenable. For example, research on impression management and self-presentation (e.g., Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Schlenker, 1980; Wolfe, Lennox, & Cutler, 1986) is fundamentally based on the assumption that people attend to and care about public aspects of their identity. Similarly, since Mead’s (1934) proposal that people develop a sense of self by internalizing their perception of how others see them (see also Cooley, 1902), developmental psychology has relied heavily on the public self as a key element in identity formation (e.g., Harter, 1999), and the public self’s theoretical importance continues to increase with the growth of developmental neuroscience (e.g., Jankowski, Moore, Merchant, Kahn, & Pfeifer, 2014).

Classic research on self-monitoring (Snyder, 1974) and the distinction between private and public self-consciousness (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) also rests on the view that at least some individuals define themselves through their public reputation and appearance, as does classic research on normative social influence and conformity (e.g., Asch, 1951; Barron, 1953; Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). Likewise, research in consumer psychology, such as the literature on the value of possessions (e.g., Richins, 1994) or consumer decisions (e.g., Ratner & Kahn, 2002), stresses that others’ views of individuals’ identities shape consumer behavior, and health psychologists have demonstrated the importance of understanding self-presentation concerns both when studying health behaviors and when trying to improve them (e.g., Hillhouse, Turrisi, & Kastner, 2000; Martin, Leary, & Rejeski, 2000). Furthermore, recent research on the experiences of people with concealable stigmatized identities – such
as LGBTQ people (e.g., Sedlovskaya et al., 2013) – underlines the potentially devastating consequences of having to constantly monitor and manage one's public identity. Accordingly, there is not only strong empirical support for the inclusion of the public self in models of the self-concept, but substantial theoretical justification as well.

Moreover, adopting a tetrapartite model of the self will help future researchers add nuance to their investigations and better understand the role of different aspects of identity in human motivation, cognition, emotion, and behavior. To highlight one example, several studies have investigated the hierarchy of different selves with regard to their motivational influence (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2012; Sedikides et al., 2013; Zhu, Wu, Yang, & Gu, 2016), and current research suggests that the individual self may have motivational primacy, followed by the relational self and then the collective self. Understanding the motivation hierarchy of different self-aspects can only be complete, however, when the public self is also examined, and preliminary cross-cultural research by del Prado et al. (2007) and Carpenter and Karakitapoglu-Aygün (2005) suggests that the public self likely falls between the relational and collective selves in the motivational hierarchy. Future research can continue to explore this and other questions by adopting the tetrapartite model of the self, thereby achieving a more nuanced and complete conceptualization of self and identity.

**Identity orientations**

In the previous sections, we considered the theoretical reasoning and psychometric analyses that underlay both the development of the original version of the AIQ and the subsequent revisions and expansions that culminated in the AIQ-IV and our adoption of a tetrapartite model of the self. Building on that background, in this section we review important findings from previous research on identity orientations, after which we discuss what we see as interesting and important directions for future research. Given the scope of the present paper, our goal is not to provide an exhaustive review of previous work, but rather to provide an overview of select findings that highlight the role that identity orientations can play in much of personal and social life. Because of the timeline of the development of the AIQ-IV scales, there is more research on personal and public identity orientations than on collective and relational identity orientations, a disparity we hope will continue to decrease with future research (e.g., Cheek, Tropp, & Cheek, 2017; Meca et al., 2015).

**Self-perception and social behavior**

Research examining differences between people with a personal identity orientation and people with a public identity orientation has revealed that identity orientations play a large role in influencing how people think about and react to how other people see them. For people high in personal identity orientation, private views of the self take precedence over the views of others. Indeed, personal identity orientation predicts private self-consciousness, a need for uniqueness, and autonomy. In contrast, the views of others represent an important aspect of identity for people high in public identity orientation, and public identity orientation predicts public self-consciousness, fear of negative evaluation, attention to social comparison information, and a need for inclusion (e.g., Cheek & Briggs, 1982; Cheek et al., 2017; Lamphere & Leary, 1990; Leary & Meadows, 1991; Schlenker & Weigold, 1990).
Because people with a public identity orientation place high value on others’ opinions of them, their behavior is more likely to be motivated by social pressures, and they are thus more likely to try to meet other people's expectations to create a positive impression. They are less likely to report that their judgments are free from the influence of others (Hogan & Cheek, 1983), and when in social groups, they are more likely to try to fit in with the groups’ standards or expectations (Wade & Brittan-Powell, 2000). On the other hand, Wymer and Penner (1985) found that personal identity orientation moderated agreement of self- and other-ratings of personality, as well as attitude-behavior congruence, suggesting that people who value private aspects of identity are more consistent and principled in how they act around others. The importance placed on the views of others also influences what kind of feedback induces anxiety: Barnes et al. (1988) found that when told they would receive feedback about an intelligence test either in private or in front of another person, people with a personal identity orientation were more apprehensive about private feedback, whereas people with a public identity orientation were more apprehensive about public feedback.

A public identity orientation thus raises the stakes of social interaction: interactions with others represent opportunities to perform a desired identity and to get social feedback to update the self-concept. For example, McKillop, Berzonsky, and Schlenker (1992) found that although people with a public identity orientation shifted their self-appraisals based on how they presented themselves to other people, reflecting on their identity in private had little impact on their self-views. In contrast, people with a personal identity orientation did not update their self-views after presenting themselves in different ways to other people; instead, private self-characterizations led to greater subsequent changes in their self-views.

Identity orientations also influence what motivates people to engage in different behaviors and join different social groups. For instance, Leary, Wheeler, and Jenkins (1986) asked participants to indicate what aspects of different jobs they thought were most appealing and found that people with a public identity orientation were more likely to find jobs with socially relevant outcomes (e.g., an increase in social status) appealing, but people with a personal identity orientation were more likely to find jobs with personally relevant outcomes (e.g., the opportunity to be creative) appealing. In a second study, they found that people with a public identity orientation were more likely to choose athletic activities that involved other people (e.g., basketball) and were motivated by socially relevant goals (e.g., improving their physical appearance), whereas people with a personal identity orientation were more likely to choose individual athletic activities (e.g., running) and were motivated by private goals (e.g., improving their physical health). Similarly, Johnson (1987) reported that adolescents who valued their public identity tended to be members of social groups with similar values (i.e., “popular” crowds) and adolescents who valued personal self-aspects and goals such as intellectual achievement tended to be members of similarly intellectually-oriented groups.

The research discussed above underlines how personal and public identity orientations can influence how people conform in social situations, and research by Ryder, Alden, and Paulhus (2000) suggests that a collective identity orientation can also determine the extent to which people change their behavior around others. Ryder et al. found that people with a collective identity orientation were less likely to assimilate to a new culture, instead valuing their previous backgrounds and group memberships. Several lines of research have thus explored how identity orientations shape how others’ opinions influence individuals’
self-perceptions and behavior. In the next section we consider an extension of these findings – the role of identity orientations in health and well-being.

**Health and well-being**

Previous research has suggested that different identity orientations can have both positive and negative influences on health behaviors. For instance, Leary and Jones (1993) found that people with a public identity orientation were more likely to engage in behaviors such as tanning that put them at higher risk for skin cancer; their concern about their public appearance and reputation outweighed potential health complications. In contrast, people with a personal identity orientation were more likely to engage in risk-reducing behaviors such as regularly applying sunscreen. Hagger, Anderson, Kyriakaki, and Darkings (2007) found that a public identity orientation predicted binge drinking when people perceived social norms in favor of drinking, underlining the potential risk associated with high valuation of the opinion of others.

Importantly, however, when social norms and the views of others endorse healthy rather than unhealthy behaviors, people with a public identity orientation may actually be more likely to engage in healthy behaviors. Indeed, one study found that people living in a relatively wealthy suburb, where smoking is generally viewed negatively, were less likely to report smoking if they had a strong public identity orientation (Steele, Raymond, Ness, Alvi, & Kearney, 2007). Thus, the health implications of a public identity orientation depend on the specific views and norms of an individual’s peers.

A public identity orientation may also have negative subjective consequences. People for whom public aspects of identity are important are less happy, more neurotic, and have lower self-esteem than people who value public aspects of identity less (e.g., Christopher & Schlenker, 2004; Lemay & Ashmore, 2006; Shafer, 2000). Thompson, Dinnel, and Dill (2003) also found that public identity orientation predicted experiencing more body shame. In contrast, people with a personal identity orientation have higher individual self-esteem, and people with a collective identity orientation have higher collective self-esteem (e.g., Briggs & Cheek, 1986; Cheek et al., 2017; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). It is not always true that a personal identity orientation is related to more positive affect, however: people who place importance on private aspects of identity report experiencing more guilt – a negative emotion resulting from failure to live up to personal standards – than people who place more value on public aspects of identity (whereas a public identity orientation predicts more instances of shame, an emotion related to others’ negative perceptions; Cheek & Hogan, 1983; Lutwak, Ferrari, & Cheek, 1998). Hence, an important avenue for future research is to further explore how different identity orientations predict different aspects of subjective well-being and self-evaluation, but the current research suggests that valuing public aspects of identity may be the least beneficial identity orientation for subjective well-being.

**Interpretations of the social world**

In addition to shaping how people think about others’ opinions of them, an interesting, if still preliminary, finding is that identity orientations may also influence how people understand the social world more generally. Johnson, Germer, Efran, and Overton (1988), for instance, found that people with a public identity orientation were more likely to endorse
a “mechanistic” worldview, believing that “reality is external to the knower … Persons in the mechanistic worldview are represented as reactive, passive, and completely determined by their environments” (p. 828). In other words, people for whom external aspects of identity are important see external aspects of the world as more important in explaining social behavior. On the other hand, people with a personal identity orientation understand human behavior as deriving from more internal sources: Johnson et al. (1988) found that they endorsed an “organismic” worldview, in which people “are seen as active, changing, purposeful, and autonomous. They have inherent psychological functions and structures that give meaning to behavior” (p. 828).

Seta, Seta, and Hundt (2001) described the finding that individuals’ identity orientations shape their social perception by suggesting that identity orientations function as a “perceptual lens,” focusing people’s attention on behaviors and things that relate to how they understand themselves. They showed that people with a collective identity orientation attend to information related to group status regardless of whether or not it is made salient, and are particularly attuned to differences between groups. Because of the importance of group membership to their self-concept, people with a collective identity orientation view the social world through the lens of groups and their members. Furthermore, Kowalski and Wolfe (1994) found that Americans high in collective identity orientation were more likely than those low in collective identity orientation to view the U.S. positively after thinking about a national failure, suggesting that their identity orientation framed how they interpreted their group’s behavior.

Seta, Schmidt, and Bookhout (2006) similarly showed that identity orientations predict how people explain the behavior of individuals: people with a public identity orientation explained a target person’s behavior as the result of social influences, whereas people who placed less importance on public aspects of identity were more likely to attribute the target’s behavior to his personality. Thus, in addition to shaping how people see themselves, identity orientations can shape how individuals experience and interpret the social world around them, influencing how they understand the behavior of humanity in general (Johnson et al., 1988), groups of people (Kowalski & Wolfe, 1994; Seta et al., 2001), and specific individuals (Seta et al., 2006).

Future directions

The research reviewed above reveals a wide range of applications of identity orientations, and one goal of the present paper is to encourage future research on how the perceived importance of different aspects of identity influences emotion, cognition, and behavior. Here we briefly highlight three pressing directions for future work, but there are many more questions ripe for empirical and theoretical attention.

As was evident in our review, relational identity orientation has thus far received little examination. However, our research shows that relational identity orientation is psychometrically distinct from the other three identity orientations, and therefore future research has a strong foundation on which to begin the study of relational identity orientation. We predict that the study of friendships, romantic relationships, and family relationships would particularly benefit from considering relational identity orientation. Previous research has highlighted the value of investigating the extent to which people define themselves in terms of their relationships (e.g., Cross et al., 2000), and future research could add nuance to this line
of investigation by including the importance of relational identity – that is, relational identity orientation – in addition to examining relational self-construal. Relational identity orientation may predict, for example, romantic commitment and fidelity, prosocial and self-sacrificing behavior for close others’ benefit, and the extent to which one’s personal relationships influences one’s happiness and satisfaction with life.

Future research would also benefit from considering interactions among different identity orientations. In this article we have largely considered each identity orientation separately, but our theory is that identity orientations are relatively independent, and people can therefore be high or low on multiple orientations. Indeed, Meza et al. (2015) recently demonstrated the importance of considering different identity orientations in combination with each other. In an examination of psychosocial development and adjustment in young adults, Meza et al. found that the healthiest people were those who were high on personal, relational, and collective identity orientations, but low on public identity orientation. Understanding how valuing some aspects of identity but not others influences well-being and other outcomes will hence likely be a fruitful agenda for the future.

Finally, the research on cross-cultural variation in both the importance of different identities and how identity orientations influence cognition and behavior is just beginning. Cultural values play an enormous role in how people view the self (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 2010), but there has been relatively little research on identity orientations across cultures. Our preliminary evidence suggests that people from more collectivistic cultural contexts tend to report a greater collective identity orientation, which is consistent with the findings of Carpenter and Karakitapoglu-Aygün (2005). Reddy and Gibbons (1999) found that socioeconomic status was associated with identity orientations, such that poorer people in India had higher collective identity orientations and lower personal identity orientations than wealthier people; and del Prado et al. (2007) also found that people from the U.S., Mexico, Australia, and the Philippines varied systematically in the importance they placed on different aspects of identity. The unique role of public identity orientation may become increasingly important as research on the cultural dimension of tightness-looseness continues to burgeon, given that previous findings suggest that people in tighter societies pay more attention to their public self-presentation than people in looser societies (e.g., Gelfand et al., 2011; Triandis, 1989). Indeed, this line of research may shed light on the question of why our previous work on cultural differences in identity orientations found differences in collective identity orientation but not public identity orientation (see Table 2): we focused on the dimension of individualism-collectivism, which is relatively orthogonal to tightness-looseness (Gelfand, 2012), and it may be that the former better predicts collective identity orientation while the latter better predicts public identity orientation. Thus, preliminary research has indicated that there is cross-cultural variation in identity orientations, and more systematic work to understand how patterns of identity orientations vary across different cultural contexts is needed. This is particularly important given our proposal that previous models of the self, which have informed substantial cross-cultural research, are incomplete, a limitation in the literature on self and identity that we believe the tetrapartite model of the self, with its reclamation of the public self, helps address.
Conclusion
In this article we set out to review our work on identity orientations and the AIQ-IV. Building on our research and the research of many others over the past 35 years, we sought to outline our current theoretical perspective on the self and to make a case for the adoption of a tetrapartite model of the self in future research. There are many exciting and important questions awaiting researchers’ attention, and we hope that we have illustrated how considering identity orientations and a tetrapartite model of the self can provide a valuable framework for future investigations.

Acknowledgements
We thank Julie Norem, Angela Bahns, and Linda Tropp, as well as editors Elizabeth Haines and Michael Bernstein and two anonymous reviewers, for valuable comments on earlier versions of this article.

Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Funding
Nathan N. Cheek was supported by a Nation Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship and Jonathan M. Cheek was supported by a research grant from the Wellesley College Psychology Department.

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